UPDATE NOVEMBER 2006 PART ONE

"Voice of the People" Lobby Group is proud to present the true facts of our Customs Officers Association's battle with the Howard-Liberal-National coalition and the Government Bureaucrats.

The following articles were published in the Customs Officers Journal by their former President Peter Bennett.  Discover how the Customs Services Association (COA) concerns are ignored by their Bureaucratic masters from the Australian Customs Service (ACS).

You will discover how the Federal Government and their Bureaucracy ignore on hands advice, and continue to waste Australian taxpayers hard earn money.

The following articles were published by Peter Bennett Federal President of the Customs Officers Association (COA).

There are 5 issues:

 

I. The disclosure of the SKSA Security Report and the Sir John Wheeler Airport Report.

2. How to replace the Non Disclosure Regulation of the Public Service Act.

3. ACS interference with the Parliamentary JCPA Aviation Enquiry

4. The new CMR -Integrated Cargo System (ICS) 5. The new Industrial Relations Act - What price Workplace [Dis] Agreements.

 

1. The disclosure of the SKSA Security Report and the Sir John Wheeler Airport Report

The women in the USA who blew the Whistle on Enron, and the 9/11 FBI debacle were on front page of Time Magazine. The Officer who released the SKSA Security Report should be on the front page of the Bulletin. The Officer who released the Report deserves public gratitude and public acclaim. That officer has, single-handedly done what the COA has not been able to do for 15 years. (S) He has forced the Government to take an unblinkered look at the gaggle of border agencies and the complete mess that has been mislabelled, `Border Control.'

 

But instead of accepting that the Officer simply released a Report that should have been released by a relevant SKSA Senior Officer, National Manager or CEO, our Senior Management infers that they may/would consider charging him/her if they can find him/her. On the other hand our Senior Management make no comment about their failure to provide this very relevant information to the Minister. And the Minister takes no action against ACS Management for those failures. When does that provision of the PS Act dealing with `accountability' actually get used. It is supposed to apply to CEO's - but perhaps there is some small print that excludes the CEO or other Senior Officers of Customs.

 

Sir John's Report states that "Intelligence material, particularly from Customs, confirmed significant threats and vulnerabilities at major airports that are consistent with the reporting by The Australian on 31 May and 1 June 2005 of the unauthorised release of a classified Customs staff-level assessment at Sydney Airport" and...~. "Policing at major airports in Australia is often inadequate and dysfunctional, and security systems are typically uncoordinated. The roots of this include bureaucratic turf protection and unresolved Commonwealth/State conflicts over resources. To ensure policing is adequate and coordinated, the recently announced AFP Airport Security Controller positions should clearly be Airport Police Commanders, who may be seconded from well-qualified State and Northern Territory police for a five-year term." 

 

For 15 years, the COA has been telling Customs management, and the Government that the drift towards multiple agencies with undefined authorities and overlapping responsibilities was a recipe for disaster. The drift became a rush in 1996, when the current ACS administration stripped the historical elements out of Customs and introduced legislation that limited Powers of Officers. We complained about this abrogation of Customs responsibilities. But for our efforts to help avoid those problems, which the Sir John has confirmed, Customs management only increased their vitriolic actions against the COA and me in particular.

 

Customs Management have decimated and fragmented traditional Border Controls. Now that there is no agency specifically responsible for Border Controls it makes no sense to compound the problem of multiple agencies, overlapping responsibilities and dysfunction by bringing another 8 Police forces into the mix. Sir John has highlighted (below) the weakness of having a piecemeal Border Control structure. Border Controls at airport, seaport and costal areas need dedicated staff that develop levels of border environment expertise.

 

[Wheeler Report] "The reason for this is that policing at an airport is a special skill for which all officers involved need to be appropriately trained so that they can deliver the full range of policing services. Such policing services are not confined to counter terrorism and the reactive investigation

 

of so-called 'community policing' incidents. They should also include the proactive prevention, investigation and detection of serious, organised and volume crime and other offences, the maintenance of the peace, public reassurance, and ensuring public safety (with a particular emphasis on the capability to respond professionally to a major incident or emergency)".

 

The answer is a Border Protection Agency of which sworn Customs Officers would be the core.

 

2. How to replace the Non Disclosure Regulation of the Public Service Act.

The Regulation to stop Public Servants from disclosing information that `could' be adverse to Government policy or agency practices was disallowed in the Senate.

 

We made representations to the ALP (Senator Carr) and the Democrats (Senator Allison) about .the Regulation. The opposition accepted out view that the Regulation was not consistent with the implied Constitutional entitlements of political comment and the rights available under the International Human Rights Conventions. The Opposition disallowed the Regulation.

 

The Regulation provided that the determination of breaches was left to the discretion of Bureaucrats. If they thought that something said by a public servant could be adverse to Government policy or administration then that was sufficient to sustain a charge under the Regulation.

 

In this Journal there is a draft proposal for a new Regulation. The proposal has been floated amongst a few members and is open for further discussion. Comments would be welcome.

 

This proposal puts the onus on the Agency/ Government to prove that the alleged disclosure would or did cause real and significant harm to the agency before a charge could be sustained. If there was or would be no harm then why must the matter be kept secret. It also specifies the subjects that should be avoided and if disclosed may cause real or significant harm to an agency or the Government.

 

3. ACS interference with the Parliamentary JCPA Aviation Enquiry

Members will have received an email from the COA inviting them to provide comment to the Parliamentary (JCPA) Enquiry into Airport Security. Shortly thereafter DCEO (J) ordered that emails to and from the COA email-box be blocked.

 

This is the second time the ACS Executive have pulled a similar stunt of interfering with COA matters before the JCPA. The last time was during the AQIS enquiry. We have again advised the JCPA of this systemic conduct but let's wait and see. It is my view that the conduct of the ACS Executive is a clear breach of Parliamentary privilege and should be acted upon with all force necessary. .

Some documents related to the ACS conduct and the JCPA response are in this Journal issue.

 

4. The new CMR -Integrated Cargo System (ICS) -

The ICS is now $200m or 700% over budget. It is more than 3 years late. It will not deliver all the facilities promised at the outset. Hundreds of errors in the software are recorded with less than 3 weeks to implementation. Many functions will not work and will have to be built after implementation. Work­arounds by the hundred have had to be created, The poor software (development) companies are working from an unstable and incomplete software package. Companies have had to pay for digital certificates for years that have never been used. It would seem some companies would have a legitimate claim for damages under the `detriment in public administration' facility.

 

By any standard this is a monumental mess. If this was a private industry project then there would have been a fire in June. This would have to rate as an administrative disaster of monumental proportions.

 

Yet the Minister keeps insisting that everything is alright. Perhaps he has been kept in the dark about the ICS project in the same fashion that he was kept in the dark about the dysfunction at airports.

So what action has the Government taken against those responsible for the mess. Perhaps there is no-one responsible. Perhaps this project just kind of grew and no-body should be held to account. Perhaps Santa Claus and Flying Pigs are true. Certainly the ACS Executive have proved that white elephants are true.

 

5. The new Industrial Relations Act - What price Workplace [Dis] Agreements.

It is difficult to criticise legislation that has not been disclosed but it is fair to say that no worker is likely to benefit from the Government's proposed Workplace legislative reforms. There has been no public or workplace consultation - just a rush to implement legislation that will be likely to crush employee rights. This is completely consistent with this Government's ethic and culture. If ever the complacency of the Australian worker was to be mobilised in industrial and political action -this will be the time.

A Customs Officer's comment~ about the email 'warning' to staff about making submissions to the JCPAA Airport Inquiry.

 

"When you think about it, the email that was sent out to all staff was the lepers bell of incompetence. It unequivocally exposes management as having something to hide, otherwise they would not have acted in desperation and sent it to us. An organisation with nothing to hide would not send out such an email. In fact a competent, open and accountable organisation adhering to Public Service Act Values and Code of Conduct and in accord the principles of "continuous improvement" would do the opposite and ENCOURAGE their staff to speak to the inquiry into border security. Many officers could have some worthwhile things to say. Only the reprisals that Management would be likely to inflict is keeping Officers silent. Management clearly aren't interested in the security of this country. Their skins seem to have a higher priority on their sliding scale of skewed corporate mission objectives."

 

Name withheld at request

 

PRIME MINISTER

SECURING AND POLICING AUSTRALIA’S AIRPORTS

 

Today I am pleased to announce new measures to further tighten security at Australia's major airports, providing additional Australian Government expenditure of almost $200 million.

 

In this context, I am also releasing the report of Sir John Wheeler on airport security and policing arrangements.

 

Sir John has provided the Government with a comprehensive and detailed report that takes a fresh and independent look at our airport security and policing arrangements.

 

Overall the report makes a positive assessment of Australia's airport security policy settings. The report notes the significant resources provided by the Australian Government to combat terrorism in response to the post-11 September security environment.

 

However, the report does identify some areas where airport security could be improved, including policing arrangements at major airports, to better combat criminal and terrorist activity.

 

The Government has considered the recommendations of the report and accepts the thrust of all the recommendations.

 

While the initiatives announced today address the issues raised in Sir John's report a number were already underway as the review was being conducted.

 

A key recommendation of the report was for the appointment of Airport Police Commanders and the integration of Commonwealth and state policing at all major Australian airports. Implementation of these recommendations in particular will require close cooperation with state and territory governments.

 

Accordingly, I will be seeking the agreement of states and territories at the special Council of Australian Governments (COAG) meeting on counter-terrorism on 27 September to work cooperatively to implement the recommendations of the report.

 

Specifically, I will request agreement from states and territories to provide trained police officers to support a new Airport Police Commander structure at all airports with a counter-terrorism first response presence. Funding and coordination arrangements for this policing function will be discussed at the COAG meeting but the Australian Government stands ready to make a significant financial contribution to do its part to ensure this important role is filled

 

COA COMMENT:

 

The 'Wheeler' Report has identified many of the same things about which the COA has been complaining for years.

This Report has cost millions and now it will take millions to fix. But when the COA told the Government for FREE that the bureaucrats were covering up the dysfunction and compounding problems caused by a bad border structure - we were ignored. The fact that we complained about the system only caused this Administration to attack us with greater zeal. (See 2002 letter to State Premiers on pages 15 and 17.)

 

The new initiatives I announce today include:

 

 $40.9 million for the establishment of five new Joint Airport Investigation Teams at Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth airports to address serious and organised crime (includes APP $36.5 million and Customs $4.4 million);

 

$48.7 million for increased air-side Customs border patrols at Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide, Perth, Darwin and Cairns airports to provide a more visible presence to deter and respond to criminal activity;

 

$19.8 million to further upgrade the Customs closed circuit television (CCTV) capabilities, including assistance for airport operators and additional cameras at major airports;

 

a $38.0 million dollar package to strengthen air cargo security arrangements, including the introduction of improved technology for the detection of explosives;

 

$43.9 million for improved security and crime information exchange arrangements for aviation (includes $20.5 million for the Australian Crime Commission and $23.4 million for the Department of Transport and Regional Services); an immediate review of the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 and associated regulations; the further tightening of background checking and processing arrangements for the issue of Aviation Security Identification Cards; and $3.8 million to introduce a new national aviation security training framework to support the aviation industry.

 

Governments cannot afford to be complacent about security. While these measures are only a small part of our overall response to the current security environment, they are a comprehensive response to the issues raised in Sir John's report and will significantly strengthen our aviation security arrangements. I look forward to the support of state and territory governments in implementing them.

 

Greater powers for new graft watchdog

By Simon Kearney - The Australian - 20 SEP 2005, Page 007

 

CUSTOMS, immigration, welfare and taxation investigators are set to come under the jurisdiction of a powerful new federal anti-corruption body that will initially oversee the Australian Crime Commission and Australian Federal Police.

 

COA Comment:

 

Investigators? Only Investigators?

 

Ostensibly this legislation is about ensuring the integrity and honesty of Law Enforcement practices and procedures. And to that end, the introduction of this type of legislation is commendable.

 

However there is a question as to why it does not cover all Commonwealth Law Enforcement practices and procedures.

 

If an Officer has a law enforcement role then they should be subjected to any legislation, which ensures that justice is exercised properly and is seen to be exercised properly.

 

In particular, there is a real need to ensure that Senior Officers are caught (no pun intended) by such legislation.

 

Senior Officers who authorise investigations or who authorise references .to carry out internal investigations need to be accountable and their decisions need to be transparent. There is evidence that some Senior Bureaucrats use their powers for what is described in law as 'to obtain a collateral advantage". In other words they use their powers to benefit their particular interests.

 

Legislation requiring that 'Integrity' is exercised in law enforcement practices should apply across all ranks and in particular should be promoted and upheld by Agency Executive Officers. That is not enforceable at present.

 

However it is likely that any penalty provisions that may arise from such legislation will be restricted to operational officers and Agency Executives will undoubtedly attempt to be exempt from such provisions.

Legislation to create the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI) is being drafted but the Howard Government has flagged vastly increasing its responsibilities.

 

"We haven't used the word police because it may very well be expanded to commonwealth law enforcement generally," Justice Minister Chris Ellison told The Australian yesterday.

 

"There is a second tier, you're looking at DIMIA (Department of Immigration), tax (Australian Taxation Office), Customs (Australian Customs Service) and perhaps Centrelink."

 

Senator Ellison said the legislation was being drafted so the new body could be expanded quickly by changing regulations to cover the broad range of commonwealth law enforcement investigators.

 

"I certainly wouldn't be surprised to see it expand to Customs. In relation to tax, they have a strong law enforcement aspect," he said.

 

In July the federal Government secured the agreement of the states on the operation of the new body, which has been given $9.5 million over four years and is due to be set up by the middle of next year.

 

Police Federation of Australia chief executive Mark Burgess welcomed the move to expand the commission's brief but questioned whether there would be safeguards to ensure police received natural justice.

 

"It would be hard to justify the costs of establishing the commission if it's just looking at police. It should be looking at the wider federal public sector," Mr Burgess said. "(But) it's important to make sure people are treated with natural justice, so that it's about corruption and only about corruption and not managerial issues."

 

The new body will have the powers of a royal commission and will be able to hold compulsory hearings where witnesses are forced to answer questions or face prison.

 

Senator Ellison said anti-corruption investigators would have access to a variety of covert surveillance warrants and be able to intercept phone calls.

 

"I think it's essential to have those sort of strengths to your arm," Senator Ellison said.

 

The new commission will be concerned with serious systemic corruption and will leave minor matters to existing disciplinary processes within departments.

 

The police federation was critical of the time it took the Government to move on the commission after announcing it planned to set up an anti-corruption body in June last year. The decision followed revelations in The Australian about corruption allegations involving seconded state police working for the ACC, the successor to the National Crime Authority.

 

Senator Ellison said last year's federal election and getting the agreement of the states on how the commission would deal with state police seconded to the ACC had delayed the establishment of the commission.

 

He said the federal Government was now confident it had the constitutional power to give the new commission the power to investigate state police seconded to the ACC. In a submission to a parliamentary inquiry into the operation of the ACC, the AFP said the new commission represented "a welcome strengthening of the ACC's integrity regime".

 

CUSTOMS OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA FEDERAL OFFICE

                                                                                                                        P.O. Box

                                                                                                                        Kippax ACT 2615

                                                                                                                        (02) 6254 1850 ph

                                                                                                                        (02) 6254 3755 fax

                                                                                                                        coa_aust@iprimus.com.au

 

23 October 2002

 

The Hon Bob Carr, Premier, New South Wales,

(02)

9349-4594 fax

The Hon Peter Beattie, Premier, Queensland,

(07)

3221-3631 fax

The Hon Steve Bracks, Premier, Victoria,

(03)

9651-5054 fax

The Hon Dr Geoff Gallop, Premier, Western Australian,

(08)

9322 1213 fax

The Hon Mike Rann, Premier, South Australia,

(08)

8463-3168 fax

The Hon Jim Beacon, Premier, Tasmania,

(03)

6234-1572 fax

The Hon Clare Martin MLA, Chief Minister, Northern Territory

(08)

8901-4099 fax

The Hon Jon Stanhope, Chief Minister, Australia Capital Territory.

(02)

6205-0433 fax

 

Review of Australia's Border Protection Functions

 

Dear Premiers and Chief Ministers

 

I am the Federal President of the Customs Officers Association and have participated in many formal reviews of Customs and border protection related matters for over 25 years.

 

If asked to design a national border protection scheme would anyone establish;

 

a) 8 primary agencies and about 8 lesser agencies, each with their own distinctive legislative base - most of which are adversely effected when any of several primary agencies change their legislation,

 

b) and each agency having dual roles of commercial facilitation with policy development and a regulatory

control regime - this facilitation and control dichotomy has diametrically opposed objectives,

 

c) with one agency having a fairly broad area of protection interest (ie Customs) but with every other agency

concentrating on one or two specific protection interests (ie AQIS and Immigration),

 

d) each agency requiring MOU's to overcome the lack of co-operate between agencies,

 

e) each agency exercising self serving patch protection during border operations, with muddled lines of

authority and responsibility,

 

f) each agency with their own separate intelligence system - none of which is directly accessible by   the operational units of other agencies,

 

g) Intelligence sharing restricted and metered between agencies to avoid loss of control (and prestige),

 

h) each agency recruiting, selecting and training their staff at different standards, levels of security and all

 

i) with enormous resource costs of these paralleled, duplicated and overlapping border functions,

operating under differing operating instructions.

The answer is obviously - NO! - No rational person would design and maintain such a scheme. Yet this is the current federal national border protection arrangement.

The situation is actually worse than that described.

 

There is the additional factor of the involvement of the Federal Police and the military

forces. Under this arrangement the lines of control are completely muddled. It is almost as if this arrangement is deliberately constructed to avoid accountability. Recall the "children overboard" fiasco.

 

Moreover, state agencies currently have to deal with a multitude of competing federal agencies, each time they have concerns about imported threats or actual breaches of the border controls.

 

The gun control issue is a simple example of the confusion about who is and who should be responsible for controlling importation's. All firearms are conditionally imported underfederal legislation. All imported firearms could easily be controlled and regulated by a national register created and maintained by Customs. Those conditions can be imposed for an infinite period, specifying the conditions for each and every user of those firearms - forever.

 

The national border protection arrangements are a mess. But they are being perpetuated because the current government has accepted the bureaucratic mandarin's argument that there is no solution or the solution is too hard. Their self interest are being put before the public interest.

 

At present there is no agency responsible for border control. Nor is there any agency accountable for the effectiveness of border control. Responsibility and accountability are not a factor in the current border protection arrangements.

 

There is a solution - a Single Border Protection Agency. The emphasis is on the function of `Protection'. The agency would be responsible for the border protection of the nation. The agency could be formed by stripping the border control/regulation functions from the multitude of current agencies with border control functions. No increased staff, just greater border control efficiency.

 

The new agency would be an accredited Commonwealth enforcement agency that would have an enforcement oversight role and access to all the commercial and processing data available from all agencies with a border related function. The commercial, revenue and processing border agency functions would continue as a strict administrative system, without the complication of an integrated control or enforcement function.

 

A Single Border Protection Agency would remove all the impediments, weaknesses, duplications, patch protection, narrow focus, inefficiencies and burgeoning costs of the current arrangements. More importantly for the state governments, a Single Border Protection Agency would be more effective. An effective national Protection Agency would substantially reduce costs and expenditure currently being carried by the states and territories.

 

I urge state and territory governments to promote the establishment of a Single Border Protection Agency. Raising this issue publicly would force the matter into the public arena, thus giving the national electorate an opportunity to consider an alternate border arrangement that would be superior in every element to that which currently exists.

 

I would be happy to discuss this matter with representatives from any Premier or Chief Officer's office. For further reference, please see the COA related submission to the current AQIS Review - http:// www.aph.gov.au/house/ommittee/jpaa/Aqis/Submissions/sub2l.pdf

Yours Sincerely

P.P. Bennett

Parliament of Australia

JOINT COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS AND AUDIT

Parliament House, Canberra ACT 2600I Phone: (02) 6277 4615 I Fax: (02) 6277 2220 I

 

10 August 2005

Mr Lionel Woodward

Chief Executive Officer

Australian Customs Service

Customs House

5 Constitution Avenue

 CANBERRA ACT 2601

 

cc: Mr Peter Bennett, Federal President, Customs Officers Association of Australia

 

Dear Mr Woodward

 

As you know, the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit is conducting an inquiry into aviation security in Australia. The Committee has received the attached submission from the Customs Officers Association, expressing concern about the

notice circulated to all Customs staff on 4 July (included in the enclosed submission). That notice referred to the inquiry and cautioned Customs staff to be mindful of their obligations when making public comment, including the requirements of Section 16 of the Customs Administration Act 1985 in relation to unauthorised disclosure of protected information held by Customs.

 

The Committee accepts that Customs staff should be mindful of their statutory obligations. However, we would be greatly concerned if the notice to staff impeded the work of the Committee, by restricting the capacity or willingness of Customs staff or the Customs Officers Association to provide information to the inquiry.

 

The Committee would therefore welcome your written response to the claim by the Customs Officers Association that "the notice is clearly intended to dissuade Customs officers from providing information [and] is saturated with implied threats

of disciplinary or other more serious action if an officer provides information to the COA or anyone else which may be useful to your inquiry".

 

In the event that any citizen were to express fear of retribution (whether founded or not) for providing evidence to the Committee, their attention would be drawn to the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987, which provides that a person shall not:

influence another person in respect of any evidence given before a parliamentary committee;

induce another person to refrain from giving such evidence; or

"inflict any penalty or injury upon, or deprive of any benefit" another person on account of giving, or proposing to give, evidence.

 

The Act also effectively provides that a person is immune from legal action in respect of lodging a submission with a committee, or any statements contained in that submission. If the submission is authorised by the committee for publication, its distribution is also immune from legal action.

 

We have also been advised that Customs has recently blocked access from its work computers to the Association's e-mail address; if this is correct, I would welcome your written confirmation that this action was not related to the call by the Association for staff input to its submission to the inquiry.

 

Thank you for your assistance with this matter. Any queries may be directed to the committee secretary at ph. 6277 4615, Suite R1-108 Parliament House Canberra.

 

Yours Sincerely

 

Bob Baldwin MP

Committee Chair

 

Australian Government

Australian Customs Service

 

30 June 2005

 

Mr Peter Bennett

PO Box 146

Kippax ACT 2615

 

Dear Mr Bennett

 

I refer to your letter dated 11 June 2005.

You raised three questions in your letter which I answer as follows:

 

The letter below has been reformatted to fit the page.

 

COA COMMENT:

 

This letter is about the disclosure of the 54 page Airport Security Report (SKSA). The ACS makes no reference to the public service performed by the disclosure the Report. The only consideration is whether there has been a breach of the Code of Conduct. Why not just state that no action will be taken against the heroic officer. Clearly the Report was a matter of public interest and no real harm was done to the ACS = Hence no action needed against the Officer who released the information.

 

More importantly; where is any advice about the investigation into the SES Officer who failed to advise the Minister?

Does the release of the aforementioned (public interest) report by an officer constitute a breach of the new Public Service Code of Conduct Reg 2.1 or any other Code of Conduct provision or other legislative restriction.

 

If so, please identify the breach that applies in such a case and please identify the elements of the breach as per a relevant charge.

In the absence of a full investigation into the circumstances of the disclosure of the report it is not appropriate to speculate on whether its disclosure constituted a breach of the APS Code of Conduct (Code) or legislation. The circumstances of a suspected breach of the Code must be fully examined before drawing any conclusions as to whether a breach of the Code or any relevant legislative restriction occurred.

 

Regulation 2. 1 has been disallowed. I enclose a copy of circular Number 2005/3 Disallowance of Amendments to the Public Service Regulations 1999 - Regulation 2.1 (Disclosure of Information) issued by the Australian Public Service Commission.

 

2. Will or would ACS senior management under these or similar circumstances take any form of adverse action against an officer who releases such information.

Would any adverse action be taken against the officer if the release of that information does not cause material harm to a function of Customs.

 

As I have noted in my response to your first question, it is not appropriate to speculate on whether a particular action constitutes a breach of the Code or other legislation. It is also not appropriate to further speculate on what action might occur as a consequence of a finding of a breach of the Code.

 

3. What rights exist for an employee to make media comment about a matter that does not cause material harm to the functions of Customs and/or are those rights affected by virtue of that employee holding office in an industrial organisation and making comment on behalf of that organisation.

 

In relation to Customs employees rights and obligations in relation to public comment, I refer you to the Customs Ethics and Conduct Booklet which sets out obligations employees have in relation to making public comment. I also refer you to the Dealing with the Media Procedures issued by Customs which also contains details of Customs employees obligations in relation to public comment. I also refer you to the APS Values and Code of Conduct in Practice; a guide to official conduct for APS employees and Agency Heads which contains provisions concerning public comment made by APS employees.

 

Finally, I note that all Customs employees have an obligation of loyalty and fidelity which is an inherent requirement of their employment and that all Customs employees must at all time behave in a way that upholds the APS Values and the integrity and good reputation of the APS.

 

Yours sincerely

 

 

C J Marsden-Smedley

National Manager Planning and International Security stifled at big airports

By John Masanauskas ; Herald Sun; 14 SEP 2005,

 

TENSION between state and federal authorities had led to dysfunctional security arrangements at large airports, a high-level report has found.

 

British aviation expert Sir John Wheeler's report is also believed to have called for a permanent police presence at airports.

The report, handed to federal Transport Minister Warren Truss last Monday, will be considered by Cabinet next week.

 

The Howard Government announced an inquiry into airport security in June after new evidence of organised crime at Sydney.

Sir John, who led a similar inquiry in Britain in 2002, met airport, government and police officials in Melbourne last month.

 

But Australian Federal Police Association CEO Jim Torr said the AFP was better placed to process intelligence than state police.

Mr Torr called on the Government to recruit more AFP officers.

 

A spokesman for Mr Truss said the Government would not speculate on the contents of the report until it had been fully considered.

 

COA COMMENT:

 

At time of writing the Sir John 'Airport Security' report has just been made public. Instead the Cabinet is meeting to decide how to handle the shocking 'disclosure' that the security arrangements at Australian Airports are dysfunctional.

 

ACS management have known or should have known that the security arrangements have been a mess for about 15 years. They reached their lowest ebb when this ACS administration introduced the

Search and Seizure legislation in the Mid 1990's.

 

The legislation was followed up with restrictive practices and procedures which opened the way for confusion, mixed responsibilities and dysfunction.

 

Customs Officers then had their powers and authorities significantly reduced. There was a raft of practices, which significantly reduced the powers of officers and effectively deskilled much of the operational 'sharp point' workforce. This was compounded by mass redundancies of experienced enforcement officers.

 

Other than what was done, it is hard to conceive what else could have been done to foster an environment of agency dysfunction, compounded by blurred lines of control, confused authorities and avoidance of responsibilities. It almost seems that this mess was planned by this ACS administration.

 

Sir John comes from the UK - a place with a single sovereignty and a national parliament. He sees the strategic arrangements of Federal, State and Territory Police Forces and Federal and State Government Departments and on that face value, proposed a logical solution ie. Federal control of a bolstered police presence and the elimination of any control and security functions by Customs. But this model cannot work against a history of State sovereignty and a Commonwealth that imposes its will against the interests of States when it suits. The insular nature of the respective Police Forces, the resentment between Forces and the patch protection will not be overcome that easily.

 

Why should State and Territory Governments use their resources (police) to carry out the Federal Government responsibility of border control. Even if they are paid for their resources it still depletes their workforce.

 

What is proposed is a part time border security force which the Federal Government can increase or decrease at their discretion. It will mean that State police officers will be trained in specialised

 

Border Controls. Then as they rotate back to 'general' duties of State forces, that specialisation will be wasted. No contract could be considered that would stop State police officers from applying for positions within their respective Police Forces. Therefore it is inevitable that 'Border Police' will be moving easily between their specialist function and general policing. This is precisely what Sir John has warned against.

 

Imagine, a gaggle of six more (state) police forces and two (Territorial) provincial forces working under contract to a Commonwealth police force in a Customs Control area giving directions to Customs officers about border control. This would create a level of dysfunction that would make the current mess look like a well trained and organised marching team.

 

This arrangement would simply add another straw to the camel's back. It would aggravate the current rate of overlapping responsibilities, the duplication, the patch protection, the disjointed intelligence flow,

and the inability to identify responsibilities and accountabilities

The camel would grow another 6 legs. No one would know where it was heading or how to control it.

 

What a mess!!! If this was actually taken up by Government the situation would go from laughable and stupid to tragic and deranged.

 

The COA has been telling Government for the last 15 years that the current arrangements were a mess and not working. Customs management has convinced the Minister/Government that everything was just dandy.

When is somebody going to be held to account for that misinformation and for the maladministration that has been going on for years.

 

A border protection agency would work and is not too difficult to devise. All we need it to purge the troglodytes who claim that they couldn't organise it.

Airport security still full of holes, says report

 

Author: Marian WIIkinson National Security Editor With Mark Metherell

Date: 13/09/2005; Sydney Morning Herald; p5

 

A wide-ranging report of Australia's airport security has harshly criticised failures to check the criminal backgrounds of airport staff and the lack of co­operation between police and security agencies.

 

The report, by Sir John Wheeler, looks at the threat posed by organised crime and terrorism at airports around Australia and was commissioned after revelations about airport security in the wake of the Schapelle Corby case. The security failures were highlighted when a baggage handler at Sydney airport removed a camel suit from a passenger's luggage and donned the head as he drove around on an airport cart.

 

Last night the federal Minister for Transport, Warren Truss, refused to comment on claims that the report had described airport security agencies as `dysfunctional' and said the Government would not make the Wheeler report public until it had been considered by cabinet next week. The report will be discussed by the Prime Minister, John Howard and the premiers at a meeting this month. Sir John, a British security expert who had already conducted a review of London's Heathrow Airport after setting up Britain's National Criminal Intelligence Service, was appointed by the Federal Government to quell the public outcry over the security failures at Sydney Airport.

 

As evidence emerged of criminal gangs operating at the airport, including drug-trafficking, the Government announced big changes to airport security even before Sir John began taking submissions. 

 

In June the Government moved to implement a upgrade in security at airports. Shipping dangerous goods around Australia should be restricted to local vessels, the Opposition Leader, Kim Beazley, said.

The Government said the Office of Transport Security checked foreign vessels before they berthed. 

 

COA COMMENT: 

 

Dysfunctional now that is a word we didn't use in the 1975 report to Customs, or the Williams Royal Commission into Drugs, the Stewart Royal Commission, The Meat Export Scandal, The NSW enquiry into Port Security, the Review of Customs Administration and Procedures, the Conroy Report, or the 2002 AQIS enquiry etc etc . We just used overlapping, duplicated, purposeless, confused, befuddled, aimless, counterproductive, inefficient, ineffective, wasteful and directionless. But I guess 'Dysfunctional' is the word that covers it all; "An Abnormal, impaired or malfunctioning system or social group".

 

Appreciating important words would be a good Ministerial or Government exercise; Accountability would be a good word to start with. It is referred to in the APS Act but it seems to have no actual meaning in law or practice. It appears to be included in the PS Act as some sort of padding to fill in spaces on the page.

I cannot find in recent history where anybody above the $90,000 pay range has been made accountable for anything in the public service.

 

Another word that is misused by Ministers and the Bureaucrats is "checked".

Routinely Ministers refer to containers, planes, ships, cargo, ports, airports, coastlines, foreign fishing vessels, and even people as being 'checked'. Minister don't believe that 'checking' means 'examining', 'scrutinising' or 'searching' they know that 'checking' used in normal parlance means that something is 'checked' off a list. But the inference by Ministers is that these items or people are searched, examined or scrutinised. But they know this is not true in most instances. Therefore such statements would be a deliberately misleading statement.

"The Office of Transport Security checked foreign vessels ...."

 

That could be correct, they may be marked on a list but they are not searched, inspected or examined. Making such a statement seems to be a deliberate act intended to mislead the public from the facts.

Act of Grace Payments and Waive of Debts By Customs

 

Questioner Ferguson, Martin, MP (Batman, ALP, Opposition)

Responder Costello, Peter, MP (Higgins, Treasurer, LP)

 

For the period 1 January 1998 to 14 February 2005, 711 act of grace payments and waiver of debts have been approved under sections 33 and 34 of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997. Of these, the Department of Finance and Administration (Finance) has postcode information for 404 of the beneficiaries. The following are those related to Australian Customs Service Matters:

Amount

Postcode

$8,857.24

3140

$431,033.36

3142

$29,231.00

2190

$7,871.00

2190

$81,209.35

2601

$2,000.00

5051

$7,474.63

2015

 

Australian Federal Police

$10,000.00                            6016

COA :Comment

 

On the face of it, these are payments by Customs, which are in effect, administrative failures between 1998 and 2005. The 431$K and the $81 K must have been whoppers. The questions is, is anyone held to account for this sort of administrative foul up?

Customs probe uncovers security black spots;

ABC 7:30 Report Broadcast: 31/05/2005

 

KERRY O'BRIEN: But first - the nation's biggest airport is back in the spotlight tonight with a top secret Customs report revealing what they call "a hot bed of criminal activity." The leaked report claims Sydney staff with high-level security clearances, including air crew, cleaners and baggage handlers are involved in drug smuggling and stealing from passengers. News of the report, completed in early 2004, came as a major surprise to the Federal Government and the aviation industry who were all apparently kept in the dark. It's believed the Customs probe has uncovered numerous security black spots - areas of the airport which can't be captured by surveillance cameras and are reportedly exploited by staff involved in drug trafficking. Jonathan Harley reports.

 

COA Comment:

 

 The reason this came as a surprise to the Federal Government (and Parliament) is because after the raft of Royal Commissions and Parliamentary Enquiries into drug importations, abuse of border controls, managerial ineffectiveness, poor organisational arrangements and inadequate training, and the replacement of the previous Customs administration, the new Customs management advised Government that these matters would be fixed. AND THE GOVERNMENT BELIEVED IT!!! How gullible are these Ministers???.

 

The problem is that Ministers come and go. Over the last 30 years Customs has had a couple of dozen Ministers but in effect only 4 changes of administration where the top executives have gone and been replaced. So as soon as a Minster leaves the ongoing administrators simply tell the incoming Minister what they like. When Ministers leave there is no check-back to see if Government policies or directions are followed. The new Minister is then led by the nose down whatever path the bureaucrats want to take.

 

The Public Service Act Values require that the Bureaucrats provide frank, honest, comprehensive, accurate and timely advice. Clearly this failure to advise the Minister, Government and Parliament of the security mess at SKSA is a breach of the APS Values.

 

Then the APS Values claim there is accountability in the Public Service. Accountability only exists at junior levels and certainly no Executive Officer is accountable to the Australian public. Executives of agencies, if found to be at fault are regularly promoted to Diplomatic postings or are given golden handshakes. It makes one wonder what 'goods' these bureaucrats have over Ministers. Are there so many skeletons in the Governments closet that the only way to shed failed bureaucrats is to pay them off? - PBennett

 

SENATOR CHRIS ELLISON, CUSTOMS MINISTER: I haven't seen the report.

 

JOHN ANDERSON, TRANSPORT MINISTER (IN PARLIAMENT): I didn't become aware of the report until this morning.

 

KIM BEAZLEY, LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION (IN PARLIAMENT): The complacency of the Minister is extraordinary.

 

JONATHAN HARLEY (REPORTER): It appears to be the country's best-kept secret. When the `Australian' newspaper splashed across its front page sensational details of a classified Customs report into alleged security breaches at Sydney airport, everyone from government ministers to the nation's aviation bosses were oblivious to the report's very existence.

 

GEOFF ASKEW, QANTAS SECURITY CHIEF: Qantas was very surprised to read the article in The Australian this morning. We had no idea of the existence of that report.

 

JONATHAN HARLEY: Max Moore-Wilton, have you read the classified customs report flagged in The

Australian today?

 

MAX MOORE-WILTON, SYDNEY AIRPORT CORPORATION: No, I have not.

 

JONATHAN HARLEY: Were you aware of it? MAX MOORE-WILTON: No, I was not, not until I

read The Australian.

 

JONATHAN HARLEY: It's startling that a document with such alarming findings was not made known to those whose job it is to protect national security and fight crime. The report details a range of serious security breaches and illegal activities across airport operations allegedly involving baggage handlers, ramp and trolley workers, security screeners, cleaners and even air crew.

 

ROBERT McCLELLAND, OPPOSITION HOMELAND SECURITY SPOKESMAN: Well, applying again the pub test, Mr Deputy Speaker, what Australians realise is those who are most self-righteous frequently have the most to hide.

 

JONATHAN HARLEY: The Government tried to turn defence into attack, by accusing the Opposition of refusing to receive an official briefing on a report that none of them knew about.

 

JOHN ANDERSON: If he were being genuinely responsible on this, he would have sought a prior private briefing on it. He is yabbering away over there, as is his want, but he knows full well that the right thing to have done here would have been to have sought a proper briefing.

 

JONATHAN HARLEY: Australia's biggest airline, Qantas, was also unaware of the alarming allegations but says it will do whatever is asked of it.

 

GEOFF ASKEW: We have no information or evidence to suggest that there actually is organised crime occurring at Sydney airport. And I think we need to do what's necessary to restore the public's confidence. We will - we will, Qantas, support any initiative by the government to introduce screening of staff going to the workplace at the major airports.

 

SENATOR CHRIS ELLISON: There are a number of investigations under way. I can't comment on those investigations. We are taking this very seriously, but it's not cause for public panic in relation to travelling, in fact, I'd say to the Australian public that they should not panic and that they can rest assured that we have safe and secure skies.

 

COA Comment:

 

Correct Minister the only thing the public should be in a panic about it the failure of ACS management to address the issues in the Report and to advise the Minister of its contents in a timely manner.

 

Undoubtedly there are a number of investigations under way. The primary investigation is to try to find who leaked/disclosed the Report. An enormous amount of time and resources will be spent trying to identify the public servant who served the public by disclosing information (some of which at least) was information that the public was entitled to know. So there has been a witch hunt by ACS management, trying to find out who did what they should have done.

 

But is there an investigation into why Customs did not advise the Minister? No way. No one is to be held to account under the APS Act. So much for PS accountability. Instead the Minister will turn a blind eye while ACS management try to put the public servant on the firing line.

 

QUESTIONS IN WRITING:

Border Control Services - Date 10 May, 2005

 

Questioner Ferguson, Martin, MP (Batman, ALP, Opposition)

Responder Ruddock, Philip, MP (Berowra, Attorney-General, LP)

 

Answers;

 

(1)Consultation occurs between border agencies and industry on many levels. Customs is the Chair for the National Passenger Processing Committee (NPPC). The major role of the NPPC is to develop whole of Government policy approaches to processing international air passengers.

 

COA COMMENT:

 

Is the NPPC the ACS unit that is responsible for the DYSFUNCTION referred to in recent Wheeler inquiry Reports. For years the COA has claimed that the overlapping responsibilities and complex organisational arrangements concerning agencies at the Border only served the needs of crooks and senior bureaucrats.

 

These were the only people to benefit from the mess of duplicated, overlapping, conflicting authorities and differing authorisations arising from the mess that is broadly referred to a 'Border Security'.

 

The crooks benefit from the complexity of agency authorities, the breakdown in security arrangements and the uncertainty of responsibilities within agencies. The Bureaucrats benefit because no one is made to be responsible or more importantly no one is made accountable.

 

The failure of the Government to act against bureaucrats who protect their own vested interest by silencing 'and threatening staff is fast becoming the dominant Public Service culture. Is this the form of democracy that we want to promoterestablish and maintain in Australia; I think not!

 

The NPPC membership is AQIS, the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA), the Department of Health and Ageing, the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Australian Federal Police (AFP), Attorney­General's Department and the Department of Transport and Regional Services. Customs is also represented at the National Advisory

Facilitation (NatFAL) committee meetings chaired by the Department of Transport and Regional Services. NatFAL is made up of NPPC Members plus airport and airline representatives. The role of NatFAL is to implement as much as possible the internationally agreed standards and recommended practices for facilitating the movement of travellers through international airports while maintaining Australia's obligations to maintain adequate aviation security and Australia's border control legislation and policies.

 

Regional Facilitation committees at every airport meet regularly with similar agency and industry representation to provide formal avenues for addressing facilitation issues on an airport-by­airport basis. In addition to these formal mechanisms, Customs also has close and regular consultations on an informal basis with airlines and airport operators at both national and local levels.

 

There is regular consultation with other border agencies, at a range of levels both nationally and at individual airports. Customs is unable to supply the figures requested. Customs Financial Management Information system records expenses by organisational structure rather than physical location. The overall cost of Customs passenger processing function for the years requested is as follows:

 

Financial year - Customs $m

1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1999/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04

    94.2       93.7        125.0    122.7      124.6      135.9    165.0      158.3      152.4

 

The total number of inward, bound passenger movements at each international airport since March 1996 are:

  

INWARDS

1995/96

1996/97

1997/98

1999/99

1999/00

2000/01

2001/02

2002/03

2003/04

Per 1000's

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sydney

3,431

3,498

3,667

3,983

4,325

3,976

3,875

4,233

3,119

Brisbane

1,330

1,336

1,354

1,376

1,410

1,341

1,322

1,549

1,257

Melbourne

1,213

1,294

1,374

1,497

1,681

1,717

1,679

1,895

1,534

Cairns

388

368

354

346

366

370

381

411

306

Coolangatta

NA

NA

NA

NA

17

35

80

88

59

Perth

725

766

791

815

850

846

840

906

700

Adelaide

110

113

124

136

140

122

113

134

115

Darwin

92

100

95

127

141

133

79

79

56

 

QUESTIONS IN WRITING

 

 

Australian Customs Service - (Question No. 666)

Mr McClelland (Barton) asked the Minister for Justice and Customs, in writing, on 7 March 2005:

 

Can the Minister explain the discrepancy between the sum budgeted for the Australian Customs Service (ACS) for Administered Expenses (including third party outputs) for 2003-2004 of $248,000 and the Actual Administered Expenses of $23,123,000 as reported on page 30 of the ACS report for 2003-2004.

 

Answer

 

Mr Ruddock (Berowra-Attorney-General)-The Minister for Justice and Customs has provided the following answer to the honourable member's question:

The nature of each administered expense was:

Receivables - provision for doubtful debts - $17,406,000

Debts written off - $5,469,000

Contribution to World Customs

Organisation - $248,000

 

There were no amounts allocated in the 2003­2004 budget for provision for doubtful debts or debts written off. These expenses reflect a change in policy developed in consultation with the ANAO regarding the recognition and provisioning for prosecutions and fines. The World Customs Organisation was allocated $280,000 in the 2003-2004 budget; the final payment was influenced by prevailing foreign exchange rates.

COA :Comment

On the face of it, here is another stuff up, only this time the amount is in the Millions.

 

In this instance there was no amount allocated for doubtful or written off debts. These are losses to the Commonwealth. But again, is anyone held to account for this sort of administrative foul up? The Public Service Act requires that agencies are accountable. But there is no indication that anyone is accountable at the executive level.

 

 QUESTIONS IN WRITING:

Border Control Services - Date 10 May, 2005

 

Questioner Ferguson, Martin, MP (Batman, ALP, Opposition)

Responder Ruddock, Philip, MP (Berowra, Attorney-General, LP)

 

Answers;

 

(1)Consultation occurs between border agencies and industry on many levels. Customs is the Chair for the National Passenger Processing Committee (NPPC). The major role of the NPPC is to develop whole of Government policy approaches to processing international air passengers.

 

COA COMMENT:

 

Is the NPPC the ACS unit that is responsible for the DYSFUNCTION referred to in recent Wheeler inquiry Reports. For years the COA has claimed that the overlapping responsibilities and complex organisational arrangements concerning agencies at the Border only served the needs of crooks and senior bureaucrats.

 

These were the only people to benefit from the mess of duplicated, overlapping, conflicting authorities and differing authorisations arising from the mess that is broadly referred to a 'Border Security'.

 

The crooks benefit from the complexity of agency authorities, the breakdown in security arrangements and the uncertainty of responsibilities within agencies. The Bureaucrats benefit because no one is made to be responsible or more importantly no one is made accountable.

 

The failure of the Government to act against bureaucrats who protect their own vested interest by silencing 'and threatening staff is fast becoming the dominant Public Service culture. Is this the form of democracy that we want to promoterestablish and maintain in Australia; I think not!

 

The NPPC membership is AQIS, the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA), the Department of Health and Ageing, the Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, Australian Federal.

 

Police (AFP), Attorney­General's Department and the Department of Transport and Regional Services. Customs is also represented at the National Advisory Facilitation (NatFAL) committee meetings chaired by the Department of Transport and Regional Services. NatFAL is made up of NPPC Members plus airport and airline representatives. The role of NatFAL is to implement as much as possible the internationally agreed standards and recommended practices for facilitating the movement of travellers through international airports while maintaining Australia's obligations to maintain adequate aviation security and Australia's border control legislation and policies.

 

Regional Facilitation committees at every airport meet regularly with similar agency and industry representation to provide formal avenues for addressing facilitation issues on an airport-by­airport basis. In addition to these formal mechanisms, Customs also has close and regular consultations on an informal basis with airlines and airport operators at both national and local levels.

 

There is regular consultation with other border agencies, at a range of levels both nationally and at individual airports. Customs is unable to supply the figures requested. Customs Financial Management Information system records expenses by organisational structure rather than physical location. The overall cost of Customs passenger processing function for the years requested is as follows:

  

CMR import system `fundamentally flawed' for users, says CBFCA

The Customs Brokers and Forwarders Council of Australia 09 March 2005

COA Comment: In September 2005 a Senior Manager made the following comment "If CMR was a Private Industry project there would have been a suspicious fire in June 2005".

 

Since June, the Government has had to go back to Parliament and ask for the start date to be put back till 12 October or 7 November or...

 

Customs keeps telling the Minister and the Minister keeps telling Parliament, that the software providers aren't ready. Customs Management claim that Software Developers have failed to provide industry with reliable Integrated Cargo System (ICS) software to enable clients to use CMR. This is a total misrepresentation of the facts.

 

Customs has not produced ICS software that is sufficiently stable to enable Software Developers/ Providers to produce their commercial software packages. Of course Software Developers have failed to produce commercial software they can't guarantee that the software code they get from Customs will not be changed the next day. Software Developers are making a large financial commitment but Customs is not giving them a stable product on which to work.

Testers identify faults every day. Then the code has to go back for development and re-testing.

 

Customs coders or testers have NOT caused this situation. They are working their butts off trying to create a system that complies with the legislation and that meets operational requirements. But Customs management keeps changing what is required and how to obtain it. Rules that seemed clear at the outset have been changed and altered. There have been constant changes to what Customs wants as an end product. As parts of the system fail to work they are carved off and the coding is altered.

 

The fault lies with Executive Management. There were dozens of organisational failures that contributed to the problems encountered. However the single most crucial failure was the total lack of teamwork. This Administration has no concept of team spirit and co-operation. As soon as anyone showed some uncertainty about the process and the end product they were 'back-watered.' The rest of the troops soon learnt to nod their heads and shut up. What we have now is the product of critical silence.

 

Now we have a 3 year over-run and a 700% cost over-run. The system will be introduced on 12 October 2005 whether it works or not. Brokers and Freight Forwarders will be forced to use a system that is known to have faults and to be incomplete. Does Minister Ellison actually know the real status of the CRM project or does he just accept what he is told. Is a failure to be properly informed fall within Ministerial responsibility? At what stage does Ministerial responsibility come into play?

The Customs Brokers and Forwarders Council of Australia says that it has grave reservations about the usability of the import systems in the Integrated Cargo System computer programs at the heart of Cargo Management Re-engineering project.

The software developers and Customs agreed at a meeting on March 1 that the so-called Release 5, or the import component of CMR would start on July 1 - with a more likely actual start date in the week beginning July 4.

COMPILE is set to be turned off some 40 days after the start-up date. .

However, CBFCA says that while the software developers can develop and test systems to specification in time for that launch date, the specifications are still flawed from an end-users point of view.

 

QUESTIONS IN WRITING

 

Australian Customs Service (Question No. 665) Mr McClelland (Barton) asked the Minister representing the Minister for Justice and Customs, in writing, on 7 March 2005:

 

What sum has been allocated to the Australian Customs Service for intelligence.

 

Answer

 

Mr Ruddock (Berowra-Attorney-General)-The Minister for Justice and Customs.

 

The Government does not appropriate funding to the Australian Customs Service specifically for intelligence-related activities. Customs makes internal business decisions to allocate funding for intelligence analysis and support from the Agency's annual budget appropriation, based on Government priorities.

 

Aspects of intelligence are incorporated in much of Customs day-to-day business. It is not possible to accurately attribute costs to all intelligence activities or intelligence related systems. There is, for instance, significant intelligence functionality embedded in most Customs IT systems. Further, intelligence collection and reporting is among the duties of Customs staff carrying out compliance, enforcement or civil surveillance activities. 

 

The core intelligence analysis and support functions are carried out by Customs Risk Identification and Intelligence area. As at December 2004, 385 Customs staff (378 full time equivalent staff) were employed nationally in Risk Identification and Intelligence. Customs allocated $31.9 million in employee and supplier costs to Risk Identification and Intelligence nationally in 2004-05. 

 

The plain answer is $31.9Million for specific RI&I functions. That is the designated Customs Intelligence Section. But what does this amount cover? Is this just employee wages, or does it include computer resources, software leases, other resources. How much does the ACS actually pay for the collection, assessment and distribution of intelligence. How much is spent for NON-RI&I training of staff generally? A bland statement that an amount is allocated for RI&I is not an adequate or suitable answer.